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SUMMARY
How do you regulate concentrations of media power in a post-digital age? This is a question that has 
confounded media policy debates across Europe over recent years and it is one which, in spite of a number 
of inquiries and consultations following the unfolding phone hacking scandal in the UK, remains deeply 
unresolved. This essay is an attempt to move the debate forward by outlining how more virtuous media 
markets (those markets that serve to inform, defend and represent citizens) could be created in the UK and 
across Europe. The discussions and proposals of this essay are based on three widely accepted premises: 
1. that the crux of plurality concerns rest on the potential for a small number of media voices to dominate 
public conversation; 
2. that the BBC – by far the dominant source of news across broadcasting and online platforms – should be 
part of a new plurality framework; and 
3. that online news intermediaries – especially in search and social networking – play an integral and 
expanding role in directing information flows and should therefore also be included. 
The challenge facing policymakers in the creation and preservation of virtuous media markets has been 
underlined by the impact of new technologies on the public sphere and the emergence of new forms of 
gatekeeping and monopoly power wielded by digital intermediaries. At the same time, ‘old media’ bottlenecks 
have not gone away in Europe and much of the world. Consolidation has been the prevailing trend in online 
news consumption throughout Europe favouring a relatively small number of mostly ‘legacy’ media brands. 
Added to all this, the power vacuum left by evaporating profits and retreating corporate investors has put 
many newsrooms back in the hands of wealthy individuals, from local oligarchs in Eastern Europe hoping to 
capitalise on opportunities for political influence,1 to dot com billionaires in the US seeking to redefine the 
business of news.2
Whilst the growth of participatory news platforms and an emergent ‘fifth estate’3 has offered a challenge 
to dominant and incumbent news voices, it has far from levelled the playing field. Mainstream press and 
broadcasters still, in the main, have a much wider reach across fragmented audiences, and a far deeper reach 
into the corridors of power. Indeed, the broad thrust of empirical research suggests that news agendas on 
social media and blogging platforms are still predominantly shaped by legacy media, notwithstanding a small 
number of new entrants over recent years. 
In response to these deeply unresolved problems, plurality and transparency have become contemporary 
buzzwords in media policy discourse across Europe. They seem to capture the ideal of what a healthy, virtuous 
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1  Open Society Foundations (2014). Digital Journalism: Making news, breaking news. Retrieved from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-overviews-20140828.pdf
2  Freedman, D. (2014). The Contradictions of Media Power.  London: Bloomsbury.
3  This term is commonly ascribed to a form of journalism that is focused on critical scrutiny of the mainstream news agenda
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and democratically legitimate media system looks like, as well as the limits of what governments and regulators 
can do before encroaching on media freedom and independence. If the number of media ‘voices’ is plentiful, 
and those who exercise voice are open to public oversight and scrutiny, the risks of political capture posed by 
media concentration (of politicians by proprietors or vice versa) are dissolved. 
But of course, the reality is infinitely more complex. For one thing, increasing or preserving the number of 
media players in any given market is no guarantee for ensuring diversity of expression. Whilst some studies 
have indeed demonstrated an inverse correlation – suggesting that lower media concentration corresponds 
to greater diversity – others have found the opposite, suggesting that the more competitive a media market 
is, the more prone it is to producing homogenised content across the board.4 As the author of one such study 
concluded, “in the age of information plenty, what most consumers get is more of the same”.5
As for transparency, complex financial structures remain a key mechanism by which the ultimate beneficiaries 
of media groups can remain in the shadows, even when apparently robust media transparency laws are 
introduced. Though this is not generally a problem in the UK and northern Europe, it explains why much of 
Ukraine’s TV, for instance, continues to be bank-rolled by non-disclosed offshore sources in Cyprus, in spite of 
a new law on media ownership transparency that came into effect in 2013. A report by Freedom House notes 
that whilst the new law prohibits the financing of broadcast companies from offshore zones, it is “easy to evade 
by creating a chain of three or more shell companies with a Ukrainian broadcasting company on one side 
and an offshore company on the other. Indeed, offshore companies have not been removed from corporate 
structures of Ukrainian TV channels as a result of the law’s enactment”.6 Alongside this, in Romania there is a 
marked problem with scrutiny and ownership transparency, with several government figures being implicated 
in corruption proceedings. This includes the charging of the former chief executive of US listed and regulated 
company CME, which was also owned by a US citizen at the time (more is detailed on this case later).
Nevertheless, plurality and transparency provide useful starting points for thinking through solutions and, 
ultimately, developing new legislation that replaces legacy frameworks. There is broad consensus that these 
frameworks across Europe are out-dated and not fit for purpose. In the UK, the adequacy of the existing 
‘public interest test’ regime for monitoring media mergers was first called into question by Ofcom in 2010 
when it recommended to the Government regular periodic reviews of media plurality. Since then, this 
recommendation has been endorsed by Lord Leveson following the 2012 inquiry he led into the ethics and 
practices of the press; by the Lords Select Committee for Communications in their 2014 report on media 
plurality; and by the government itself in its own communications review in the same year. And in 2015 
Ofcom raised doubt on the necessity of the last remaining media ownership law prohibiting significant 
cross-ownership of ITV and national newspapers. 
4  For instance, whilst Glasser (1984) suggests t competition in radio can mask a lack of diversity, research by Di Cola (2006) attributes 
homogenised radio programming to ownership consolidation. 
5  Boczkowski, P. J. (2010). News at Work: Imitation in an age of information abundance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 10.
6  Freedom House (2013). One Step Forward, One Step Back: An assessment of freedom of expression
in Ukraine during its OSCE membership. Retrieved from https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FREEDOM%20HOUSE%20One%20
Step%20Forward,%20One%20Step%20Back%20-%20Assessment%20of%20FOE%20in%20Ukraine%20ENG_0.pdf
3The Mission of Media in an Age of Monopoly
All of this has underlined the need for a new legislative and regulatory framework, which Ofcom has intimated 
in its repeated deference to Parliament in determining how plurality judgements should be made, how the 
balance between regulatory ‘bright lines’ (that can act as clear triggers for intervention) and flexibility should be 
struck in a new plurality regime, and what sorts of remedies could be applied. But more than five years since 
Ofcom first called into question the adequacy of the public interest test, and after more than five related public 
inquiries, we are still no closer to determining answers to these questions. 
Whilst recognising that plurality and transparency are concepts that can be applied to the full range of 
established and emergent media policy arenas – from net neutrality to privacy and surveillance – the focus 
here is restricted to three areas of concern. They are particular to the UK context but have strong resonance for 
broader policy debates at the EU level and in many parts of the world. 
The first addresses redistributive measures to promote plurality ‘on the ground’. The effects of media 
concentration in the UK are most acutely felt in the local news sector where, according to a recent report, 
just four companies now control more than 70% of the total market for local and regional news.7 At the same 
time, spending on long form and in-depth news coverage – especially current affairs programming – has 
faced the thin edge of resource cuts in news organisations across local and national media and both public 
service and commercial broadcasting. There is clearly a public interest in sustaining these forms of journalism. 
The most logical and achievable means of support is via a nominal levy on the revenues of large scale news 
intermediaries in online search and social networking, including Google and Facebook.
The second area of focus is the future of the BBC in response to the Government’s recent White Paper for 
Charter Renewal. Since the BBC accounts for a dominant share of news consumption across platforms, its 
independence, accountability and structure are fundamental to delivering on wider plurality goals. This paper 
argues that whilst BBC production must remain not-for-profit and entirely in public hands, decentralisation 
of both management structure and delivery is essential to ensure more robust independence, genuine 
accountability, and internal plurality. Decentralisation in this sense should not be confused with, or used as a 
basis for rationalisation or cuts.
The third area concerns dominant news market players not subject to public service regulation – namely large 
scale newspaper and online news providers - but which nevertheless wield demonstrable influence over the 
wider media agenda and whose owners often enjoy privileged access to senior government ministers and 
officials. Given the acute risks of policy capture posed by such influence and access, there is a need to subject 
meetings between senior media executives and government ministers to greater public oversight and for 
clear bright lines in determining when to intervene in media markets with a view to remedying concentrations 
and bottlenecks that may have a detrimental effect on media plurality. Finally, there is a need for a new 
European task force to investigate potential ways in which news algorithms, operated by major online search 
and social networking services, could be subjected to regulation aimed at protecting and advancing plurality in 
the online news sphere.
7  Ramsay, G. & Moore, M. (2016). Monopolising Local News. Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power, Kings College 
London. Retrieved from http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/CMCP/local-news.pdf
THE PLIGHT OF LOCAL AND    
LONG-FORM MEDIA, AND HOW TO SAVE IT
It’s important to acknowledge the limitations of any form of plurality regulation. However targeted and justified, 
no remedy can guarantee to prevent or redress concentrated gatekeeping and agenda-setting power. What’s 
more, it is essential that any reforms do not open the door to overreach and encroachment on the editorial 
independence of media organisations. In this regard, dangerous precedents have been set in a number of 
countries over recent years including Hungary and Poland, where authorities have used the pretext of media 
plurality to impose laws that facilitate significant state interference with the media. A new media law that came 
into effect in Poland earlier this year, for instance, consolidates the executive’s power of appointments in public 
broadcasters and has attracted significant condemnation from press freedom and civil liberty groups.8 
Although top-down plurality remedies may be needed in particular circumstances, there is arguably more 
potential and less difficulty for policy to deliver on plurality goals by following a more bottom-up approach, 
and supporting those forms of journalism that are clearly in the public interest but are nevertheless 
struggling to survive under market conditions. Long-form journalism, which is investigative and content 
heavy in nature, in particular allows the media to hold politicians to account and provide insightful 
information, and it should be better supported.
In many parts of the world, the existential crisis faced by both newspapers and public service broadcasters has 
helped to ferment an emergent ‘third sector’ of not-for-profit news providers outside of both state and market 
frames that specialise in long-form or local news provision. Some have managed to capitalise on the cost-efficiencies 
offered by digital platforms of newsgathering and publishing, as well as ‘networked’ forms of collaborative journalism. 
The Center for Public Integrity in the US, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in the UK, Netzwerke Recherche 
in Germany, and Chiaralettere in Italy are all examples of independent not-for-profit news organisations for whom 
broadening and challenging mainstream news agendas is a core part of their mission. Examples are even more 
common in local and hyperlocal journalism where a number of charity and trust-supported local news outlets are 
surviving – and some thriving – in an otherwise crisis-ridden sector. Some (such as the West Highlands Free Press and 
Camden New Journal) have maintained print circulations and many (such as the Bristol Cable) subsist on a hybrid mix 
of funding from advertising, donations and subscriptions.
Notwithstanding such success stories, the overall picture and future prospects for long-form and local 
journalism looks grim. Newspapers remain the primary vehicles for investigative reporting but many are facing 
radical restructuring of their cost base in order to manage the digital transition, and long-form reporting is 
inevitably facing the thin end of the wedge. In the last three months alone the Guardian has announced 250 
job losses – many of them editorial – in an effort to stem its £60 million loss last year, whilst the Independent 
announced the closure of its print title altogether. Television has fared little better with a sustained long term 
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8  See Reporters without Borders (2016, 5 January). RSF calls for firm EU stance if Poland does not abandon new media law. Retrieved from 
https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-calls-firm-eu-stance-if-poland-does-not-abandon-new-media-law
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decline in current affairs spending well documented.9 Since 2010, there has also been a consistent year on year 
decline in news and current affairs investment by all public service broadcasters.10 
At the local level, the crisis is even more pronounced. As researchers at the Reuters Institute for the Study 
of Journalism stated last year: “Seeing little potential for growth, investors have lost interest in the sector, as 
demonstrated by the collapsing market value of publicly traded local newspaper companies.”11 Added to this, 
local newspaper industries are facing acute levels of market concentration. According to a recent report by 
Kings College, University of London, just four companies account for over 70 percent of the local newspaper 
market across the UK whilst their analysis of provision in local authority districts suggested that “monopoly 
coverage or dominance of a single provider is often not reduced by the availability of online content”.12
Whilst recent years have seen the emergence of new online entrants such as Buzzfeed and Huffington Post, it 
remains to be seen whether they will be able to make a meaningful contribution to long-form and investigative 
news. The recent announcement of cuts at Buzzfeed suggests that its foray into this area of journalism is 
proving less than sustainable.13 At the same time, smaller players and new entrants face an uphill struggle in 
trying to gain a piece of the referral traffic pie. Google’s news algorithm certainly appears to favour large scale 
and incumbent news brands based on metrics that reward volume of coverage and existing traffic above all.14 
Some countries have attempted to address digital disruption to news publishing businesses by enforcing so-
called ‘ancillary’ copyrights. In 2013, the German Government passed legislation requiring digital intermediaries 
to obtain a license from publishers in order to feature cached content from their articles in search listings or 
news feeds. But a law intended to make Google pay for the use of such ‘snippets’, quickly became a law that 
forced publishers to agree not to be paid.
In the aftermath of the law’s passing, Google was faced with an impromptu lawsuit brought by VG Media 
– a collecting society representing some of Germany’s largest news publishers – for what it claimed was the 
continued unlicensed use of its members’ content, in violation of the new law. But Google’s response was 
to simply exclude sites represented by VG Media from its listings with a catastrophic effect on publishers. 
Axel Springer announced soon after that it was issuing Google a royalty-free license to start including the 
9  Hughes, J. (2013). An Uncertain Future: The threat to current affairs. The International Broadcasting Trust. Retrieved from http://ibt.org.uk/
documents/reports/An-Uncertain-Future-the-threat-to-current-affairs.pdf
10  Ofcom (2015a). Public Service Broadcasting: Annual report 2015 annex. Retrieved from http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
broadcast/reviews-investigations/psb-review/psb2015/PSB_Annual_Report_2015_Background_and__methodology.pdf
11  Reuters Institute, “Local Journalism: The Decline of Newspapers and the Rise of Digital Media”, 2015
12  Ramsay, G. & Moore, M. (2016). Monopolising Local News. Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power, Kings College 
London. Retrieved from http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/CMCP/local-news.pdf
13  Lacy, S. (2016, 13 April). If Buzzfeed is screwed, everyone else is REALLY screwed. Pando.com. Retrieved from https://pando.
com/2016/04/13/if-buzzfeed-screwed-everyone-else-really-screwed/
14  Filloux, F. (2013, 25 February). Google News: The secret sauce. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2013/feb/25/1
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snippets again, after traffic to its websites plummeted.15 A number of other publishers promptly followed 
suit, as it became clear that those who refused to play by Google’s rules faced the prospect of banishment to 
a cyber-wilderness. 
But the farcical episode didn’t end there. In 2015, VG Media submitted a formal complaint to the German 
competition authority, this time arguing that by refusing to use snippets by publishers who did not agree to a 
royalty-free license, Google was abusing its dominant market position. It did not take long for the regulator to 
dismiss the complaint out of hand on the simple logic that you can’t force someone to use your copyrighted 
content in order to get paid for it.16
Other European countries have pursued divergent paths in dealing with this issue. In France, for instance, 
publishers agreed to lay their claims to rest after Google promised a fund for supporting digital innovation 
in journalism. In Spain on the other hand, legislators passed a much tougher version of Germany’s ancillary 
copyright law in 2014, making it illegal for publishers to ‘opt in’ and extending copyright restrictions to cover 
any amount of copyrighted text or hyperlinks. Google’s response in that case was to simply shut down its 
Spanish news service altogether. 
But even if ancillary copyright laws were to prove workable, they would be unlikely to deliver on plurality goals. 
This is because the principal concern with sustainability rests neither with particular providers nor particular 
types of content, but rather with particular forms of journalism. A viable democracy depends as much on the 
circulation of diverse viewpoints as it does on particular news services that promote civic accountability and 
subject all levels of public authority – as well as both state and corporate centres of power – to meaningful 
journalistic scrutiny. 
(see Case Study: Google - page 7)
A much more effective way of cross-subsidising professional news is to target those forms of public interest 
journalism – namely local and long-form – that are most endangered in the new media ecosystem. In 
prioritising particular forms of journalism, any form of cross-subsidy should be open to a range of outlets to 
bid for – large and small, commercial and non-profit, local and national – and across all platforms of delivery. 
Supporting a diverse ecology of ‘vehicles’ for these endangered forms of journalism is essential in meeting 
wider plurality goals. The particular benefit of this approach is that it incentivises both legacy news publishers 
and established brands as well as smaller and newer entrants to invest in local and long-form news, with 
potential positive knock-on effects for journalism jobs, especially at the local level. 
15  Axel Springer (2014, 5 November). Axel Springer concludes its data documentation: Major losses resulting from downgraded search 
notices on Google. Retrieved from http://www.axelspringer.de/en/presse/Axel-Springer-concludes-its-data-documentation-Major-losses-
resulting-from-downgraded-search-notices-on-Google_22070687.html
16  Bundeskartellamt (2015, 9 September). Bundeskatellamt takes decisionin ancillary copyright dispute. Retrieved from http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/09_09_2015_VG_Media_Google.html
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There is now an equally strong case for such funds to be raised by a small levy on the revenues of digital 
intermediaries that wield monopoly market power in the search and social networking markets. These 
companies have a critical bearing on news and information flows and derive significant underlying value from 
news content. Although Google, for instance, does not profit directly from news content, it forms an integral 
part of its user experience and volume base, and thus contributes substantially to the company’s bottom 
Online intermediaries have faced criticism for being overly cautious in their responses to legal threats 
and complaints. In 2002, for instance, Google blocked links to a website critical of Scientology after being 
served with a complaint under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). The incident appeared to 
underline concerns that copyright regulations posed a threat to free speech and that, in the words of one 
civil liberties lawyer, “people will attempt to silence critics under the guise of copyright infringement”.17 
In Europe, intermediaries have been placed in a similar position under the ‘right to be forgotten’, 
an addendum to data protection laws that came into force in 2014. Since then, a number of news 
organisations – as well as Wikipedia – have had articles effectively blacklisted by Google as result of 
requests under the newly defined legal right. Although many of them have been restored following 
appeals by publishers, the right has effectively placed Google in a quasi-judicial role with little 
transparency and no oversight of its decisions.
On top of this, Google now has significant lobbying and media market power. Google has been one 
of the most vociferous advocates of net neutrality regulation since it first emerged as a public policy 
issue in 2006. Yet Google itself actively discriminates between content arguably in ways that extend far 
beyond the capacity of ISPs. Indeed, Google may already have breached many of the new net neutrality 
rules it helped to bring about, at least in spirit if not the letter. Since 2010, the company has been the 
target of on-going antitrust investigations by the European Union that began over allegations that its 
search algorithm actively discriminates against rival online shopping services. 
On the other side of the coin, Google pays network operators in order to ensure that its services are 
afforded preferential treatment – an example of how its unrivalled resources can secure its privileged 
position. In 2014, for instance, it paid Apple $1 billion to retain its status as the default search function 
on Apple’s mobile operating system. It also regularly enters into negotiated deals with ISPs in order to 
secure a dedicated path into their networks. Throughout many of its activities, Google now exhibits a 
growing degree of market influence over media and the news.
CASE STUDY: GOOGLE
17  See http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/google-pulls-anti-scientology-links/
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line. In the UK alone, Google generated over £7 billion of revenues in 2015 with a search market share of over 
90%. Facebook registered £105 million of UK revenues in 2014 and commands more than 80% of the social 
networking market.
Much of these revenues stem from advertisers that once supported news publishers. Notwithstanding 
debates over ancillary copyrights, this further underlines the moral and economic case for a levy. And given 
the demonstrable capacity for intermediaries to avoid corporation tax by redirecting profits away from the 
jurisdictions in which they are generated, a small levy on advertising revenues would be a practical and 
logical basis for the cross-subsidy. It would ensure that such corporations not only make a more meaningful 
contribution to the public purse (proportionate to the scale of their revenue) but also that funds raised target 
those forms of public interest journalism most under threat in the new information paradigm. 
If a levy was imposed on those companies with more than a 25 percent share of these UK markets, it would 
currently impact only on Google and Facebook. Based on their last reported annual UK revenues, a one percent 
levy would generate in excess of £70 million.18 This level of funding would go some way to nurturing and 
sustaining a third sector of news. As an indication of potential measurable impact, the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism was established in 2010 with a start-up grant of £2million from the Potter Foundation. Within two 
years of its launch, the agency had secured over thirty-four front-page stories and produced a number of 
award-winning investigations and current affairs documentaries. 
Such funds could be redirected via an independent Media Plurality Board appointed by an independent panel 
along similar lines to the appointments system in place for the Press Recognition Panel. It could be housed 
under the auspices of Ofcom or separate boards could be appointed for the nations and operate as adjuncts 
to the national arts councils for England, Scotland and Wales. An advantage of the latter approach is that the 
principle of ‘arms-length’ funding (which prevents government or state interference) is inscribed in the arts 
councils’ structure and governance. The board or boards should operate with a defined remit to collect the levy 
and allocate funds in support of long-form and local journalism across all platforms and in all sectors. 
18  Over time, as the market matures, you would expect more players to fall within this bracket as the market becomes more diverse.
Contrary to widespread expectations and fears, the Government’s recent White Paper on BBC Charter 
Renewal promises little more than moderate change to the BBC’s governance and output remit. Despite 
describing the disappearance of the BBC as a “tempting prospect” just one month prior, Culture Secretary 
John Whittingdale has come out in support of preserving the BBC’s method and level of funding for at 
least the next five years and, perhaps more importantly, keeping the BBC entirely in public hands. 
That will come as welcome relief to those who feared a giant sell-off or switch to subscription funding, 
and an end to the BBC’s unique public service mandate as we know it. Though the door remains open 
to these pathways in the future, public ownership and license fee funding seem secure at least for the 
remainder of the current parliament. A much more worrying development, however, concerns proposed 
changes to the BBC’s governance and a system of appointments that threatens encroachment on the 
BBC’s editorial autonomy. 
This has critical implications for media plurality. To understand why, it’s worth reflecting on the extent of 
concentration within the online publishing market, and the extent of the BBC’s dominance within that 
distribution curve. SimilarWeb, a digital market research company reported in February 2016 that “the 
top 10 publishers make up a huge chunk of the U.K. media market and own more than half of the entire 
industry”19. The statement was based on data collected over the course of 2015, specifically the number of 
page visits to 300 selected digital publishers. They found that 65 percent of this traffic was concentrated 
in the websites of the top 10 publishers. The top five alone attracted more than half of all traffic across the 
sample. Indeed, if we plot the data from SimilarWeb onto a distribution curve, it yields a highly defined 
picture of acute market concentration, as shown in Figure 1 on next page.
19  Schwarz, J. (2016, 8 February). Top UK media publishers and publications – ranked for 2015. Similarweb. Retrieved from https://www.
similarweb.com/blog/index-top-u-k-media-publishers-and-publications-of-2015
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The graph reveals a high level of concentration in news consumption in the UK, a mature digital news market 
that is generally considered relatively pluralistic compared to much of Europe.20
But the head of the curve is itself dominated by a single news provider: the BBC. Indeed, the BBC’s online news 
services attracted more than three times the total traffic of its nearest rival, and more than 30 percent of traffic 
across the whole sample. From this perspective, the existence of commercial competitors within the head looks 
like a much needed check on the near monopoly status enjoyed by the BBC. Rather than worrying about the 
agenda influence of mainstream media in general, some argue that we should be concerned exclusively with 
the overarching reach and influence of the BBC.21 
But how far does the BBC’s own news agenda reflect or align with that of its commercial competitors? When 
scholars at Cardiff University set out to investigate this question during the 2015 UK General Election,22 they 
found that the BBC’s overall issue-agenda appeared to have been consistently led by national newspapers. 
Figure 1. Total number of page visits (millions) to top 100 news websites in the UK, 2015
Most popular news websites (in descending order)
Source: Similarweb, Index: Top UK media publishers and publications 2015. Retrieved from Similarweb.com
20 See, for instance, Media Pluralism Monitor 2014 Pilot Implementation – Results. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. Retrieved 
from http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/results-2014/
21  Elstein, D. (2015, 20 May). Reflections on the election: lessons to be learned. Open Democracy UK. Retrieved from https://www.
opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/david-elstein/reflections-on-election-lessons-to-be-learned
22  Cushion, S. & Sambrook, R. (2015, 15 May). How TV news let the Tories fight the election on their own terms. The Guardian. Retrieved 
from http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/15/tv-news-let-the-tories-fight-the-election-coalition-economy-taxation
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The extent of this alignment was corroborated by other research conducted at Loughborough University23 and 
by the Media Standards Trust.24 These findings showed a strong correlation between the range and rank order 
of issues covered by both television and the press.
The important point this raises for plurality concerns is twofold. First, if the commercial press exercises a strong 
influence over the BBC’s political news coverage, it makes little sense to consider it a meaningful counterweight 
to the BBC’s dominance of news consumption. The evidence from the 2015 election suggests that if anything, 
the BBC amplified an agenda that was set largely by the commercial press. Second, and by the same token, we 
ought to be equally sceptical of suggestions that the BBC provides a substantive check on the more partisan 
editorial agenda of the commercial press. 
At a time when many public service broadcasters around the world are facing varying degrees of existential 
crises, public debate is all too often reduced to a choice between preservation or market-based reforms; with 
the latter usually amounting to cutbacks or closures. What’s left off the agenda is the possibility of radical 
democratic reform aimed at reconstituting the independence and accountability of public service media. And 
this is an issue that is intimately tied to questions of media ownership and plurality. The idea that a substantive 
section of any pluralistic media system needs to be in public hands is one that retains a great deal of force,25 
in spite of the digital transition and corresponding end of channel scarcity (which underlined the original 
rationale for public service media). But the way in which public service broadcasters are structured, regulated 
and governed can have profound implications for independence in relation to both the state and market. 
There are some who argue that the BBC’s strength lies in its scale and unitary structure which is assumed to 
provide a robust defence against both government and market pressures. But there is more reason to think that 
the exact opposite is the case. A centralised and concentrated BBC is intrinsically more vulnerable to editorial 
pressures precisely because they can filter down the chain of governors, directors, managers and editors. If a 
government did seek to censor or control the BBC’s agenda, it would be far more difficult if it had to contend 
with a network of relatively autonomous entities with their own editorial and governance boards more directly 
accountable to license fee payers.
By the same token, a decentralised, networked BBC would be far more immune to market pressures that many 
believe have fostered homogenisation of its news output and a growing dependency on a commercial-press-led 
agenda. Of course, cost-efficiencies would necessitate shared resources and a central newsgathering backbone. 
But this could function more as a wire agency rather than command and control news desk. With editorial 
autonomy thus enshrined into its structure, and accountability to audiences enhanced by membership-driven 
governance, the BBC would be inherently better placed to deliver on internal plurality goals. 
23  See General Election 2015 – Media analysis from Loughborough University Communication Research Centre. Available at http://blog.
lboro.ac.uk/general-election/ (last accessed 28 March, 2016).
24  Moore, M. & Ramsay, G. (2015, October). UK Election 2015: Setting the agenda. Media Standards Trust, Centre for the Study of Media, 
Communication and Power, Kings College London. Retrieved from https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/MST-Election-
2015-FINAL.pdf
25  See Aalberg, T. & Curran, J. (2012). How Media Inform Democracy: A comparative approach. London: Routledge; and Cushion, S. (2012). The 
Democratic Value of News: Why public service media matter. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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If such an alternative sounds unthinkably radical, that only reflects how restricted the terms of public debate 
over the BBC’s future have become. Indeed, a decentralised structure along these lines has established 
precedent in Holland which was ranked the second most free media system in the world by Reporters without 
Borders in 2016.26 Although it has faced recent cutbacks and consolidation, the Nederlandse Publieke Omroep 
(NPO) has proved relatively resilient to the pressures of digitisation and continues to demonstrate public value 
in the strength of its member-based affiliates.
Specifically, the bulk of channels and airtime assigned to NPO is shared among 10 broadcasting associations. 
Eight of these function as audience cooperatives, with memberships bases that reflect the diversity of interests 
and groups in Dutch society. The remaining two are ‘task-based’ broadcasters specialising predominantly in 
news, current affairs and other factual programming. The NPO is charged with administering this network but 
does not have overall editorial responsibility for output. 
The potential configuration of a networked structure for the BBC could take many forms and the concept of 
decentralisation should not be seen as a back door route to privatisation or top slicing. If anything, however, 
the government’s white paper for Charter Renewal moves us in the opposite direction – towards greater 
centralisation – especially in its proposed ‘unitary board’ of which the majority and most senior members will 
be appointed by government. For the first time in its history, such an approach threatens to give a government 
appointee editorial responsibility for all of the BBC’s output. 
26  See https://rsf.org/en/ranking
In this final part of the essay we examine the broader regulatory picture as regards transparency and plurality 
in media markets. We begin by examining the need and potential for greater transparency in relations between 
senior political and media figures. This addresses the first aspect of Ofcom’s twin-sided definition of the media 
plurality ‘problem’, i.e. the risk that certain interests wield disproportionate influence over policymaking and 
the policy agenda, using their ownership of media as political leverage. We then go on to address the second 
aspect which concerns the need for a plurality of news sources in order to maximise potential for diverse voices 
and viewpoints to surface in the news. 
AN UNHEALTHY INTIMACY
During the Leveson hearings in 2011 and 2012, we learned about a club at the top echelons of political and 
press power in Britain that operated both as an exclusive social clique as well as a professional alliance:
The relationships within which lobbying can take place are not the everyday relationships of journalism 
and politics. They are the relationships of policy makers (actual or potential) and those who stand to benefit 
directly from those policies.27
In reflecting on the nature of relations between media and political elites, Leveson further remarked that the 
former are “highly skilled, at the level of some proprietors, editors and senior executives, at subtle and intuitive 
lobbying in the context of personal relationships and friendships”.
Of course, there is nothing legally or perhaps even ethically wrong with politicians having meetings or 
developing close friendships with media executives. The problematic question concerns the degree to which 
this kind of interaction – which takes place beyond public scrutiny or participation – yields a trickle down 
influence both over media and policy agendas and/or facilitates reciprocal influence between them. One of 
the most striking features of testimony given to the Leveson Inquiry by former Prime Ministers (including close 
friends of Rupert Murdoch) was the frank admission that their views were affected by, in the words of Tony Blair, 
“how we are treated by them”.28 
27  Leveson, B. (2012). An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Executive summary. Retrieved from http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0779/0779.pdf, p. 28
28  Blair, T. (2012). The Leveson Inquiry: Witness statement by the RT Hon Tony Blair. Retrieved from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Witness-Statement-of-Tony-Blair1.pdf
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But this is not to single out Britain: ‘cosy’ relations between senior politicians and media representatives is 
common across Europe. Over the last few years, Eastern Europe has, in particular, come under increasing 
scrutiny. Roy Greenslade, in the Guardian, has examined the issue of press freedom in the post-Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe, arguing that “in several instances, steps forward towards the foundation of press 
freedom have been matched by steps backward”.29 He singled out Romania as being particularly worrying.
In the UK, serious concerns were raised about the relationship between politicians and media at the 
time of the proposed buy-out of then BSkyB in 2010 Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. Although Leveson’s 
report found no ‘smoking gun’ of impropriety in policy deliberations, his hearings uncovered frequent 
back channel communications between government officials and News Corp lobbyists throughout the 
bid process, to the extent that counsel for the inquiry Robert Jay QC accused the then culture secretary 
Jeremy Hunt of acting as a ‘cheerleader’ for News Corp’s bid. 
Leveson concluded that Hunt had failed to clarify the role of and effectively supervise his Special Political 
Advisor, Adam Smith, though also asserted that Hunt was “entitled” to his own “strong views” on the bid’s 
merits. His final report argued that politicians should be prepared to publish the details of their meetings 
with the press, in order to avoid suspicion and in recognition of the difficulty of separating the ‘personal’ 





An example of the importance of plurality, diversity and transparency in media ownership can be found 
in Romania. The independent international watchdog Freedom House found in its 2015 audit of press 
freedom in Romania that the Presidential election of November 2014 had seen “biased coverage based 
on the political agendas of media owners and sponsors”.30 
CASE STUDY: ROMANIA
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Freedom House also found that “the private media sector is dominated by Romanian businessmen with 
political ties or holdings in other industries, and these interests typically determine an outlet’s editorial 
line”. They give the example of Dan Voiculescu, a politician and businessman, whose news outlets 
throughout 2014 launched attacks on the country’s chief anticorruption prosecutor – who was pursuing 
charges against Voiculescu. They find that the ownership structures of many outlets are very non-
transparent, with “actual ownership often obscured through intermediaries”. 
Another example was highlighted in a report by the Centre for Media Transparency. One particular owner 
the report focusses on is Ronald Lauder, son of the cosmetics tycoon Estée Lauder. He founded the Central 
Media Enterprise (CME), which has or had media outlets in Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. In 
Romania, Lauder worked with Adrian Sârbu eventually appointing him as the CEO of the CME Group. CME 
is a company listed in the USA and subject to its regulation. However, Sârbu is shortly to stand trial charged 
with tax evasion, money laundering and embezzlement dating from the time when Lauder owned the 
company (Lauder has since withdrawn from the board).
The results of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015, run by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media 
Freedom based in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, 
meanwhile find that the financial crisis of the last decade had an especially pronounced negative effect 
on the Romanian press, making journalism a more “precarious” career. This has had the result of “reducing 
professionalism and editorial independence to barely recognised principles”.31
The research suggests that existing domestic laws in Romania are “not effective in disclosing the real 
owners of media outlets”, and points to limitations in legislation regulating the ownership of both print 
media and the internet sector as well as a lack of effective sanctions to prevent ownership concentration 
in radio. Moreover, it finds that:
“No media outlet with a significant audience shows internal pluralism in its editorial content (i.e. excluding  
op-eds), and external pluralism is driven mostly by the owners, some of whom are covert, highlighting a 
problem with ownership transparency.”
CASE STUDY: ROMANIA (CONTINUED)
31  http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2015/results/romania/
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Across the West, and in general terms, the power of media institutions to draw attention to certain policy 
issues and solutions and to marginalise or exclude others from public debate is what makes the business of 
media policymaking acutely vulnerable to capture and corruptive influence. It’s important to stress that the 
flow of influence can operate in both directions: politicians may be ‘captured’ by the interests of media elites 
in some contexts whilst in others, media organisations may adopt certain viewpoints, editorial lines or focus 
on certain issues over others in deference to the will and influence of policymakers. In both cases the integrity 
and independent performance of the media is undermined. But there remains, to a large degree, a black box 
between evidence of an ‘unhealthy intimacy’ and the shape of policy and media agendas that surface via news 
outlets whose owners enjoy privileged access to the corridors of political power. 
Rather than absolving the need for regulation of media ownership and plurality, such uncertainty is precisely 
why we need it. It is the job of regulation to minimise the risks of corruption and capture that are intrinsic to 
concentrations of political and economic power. How this can be achieved amidst all the complexities of the 
converged media environment is a deeply complex and difficult question. But a starting point – and one which 
Leveson himself strongly urged – is to enhance the transparency of media policy making and in particular, 
meetings between senior government ministers and officials on the one hand, and senior media executives and 
proprietors on the other. Alongside the British example mentioned in Leveson and the Romanian case study 
detailed above, media plurality and ownership has become an increasingly important topic in Ireland as well.
In Ireland, concerns have been raised about the dominance of the domestic media landscape by the 
businessman Denis O’Brien. Independent News and Media, of which he is the largest shareholder, 
publishes both the Irish Independent and Sunday Independent (Ireland’s two largest selling 
newspapers), as well as the Sunday World and Dublin Herald. It also owns 14 regional papers across 
Ireland as well as 50% of the Irish Daily Star.
Looking beyond the printed press, O’Brien’s Communicorp Group owns both of the two foremost Irish 
commercial radio talk stations, Newstalk and Today FM. This concentration of ownership led to the National 
Union of Journalists calling in April 2016 for a commission on the future of the Irish media to be established.32
This dominance has also led to criticism from commentators such as Fintan O’Toole (writing in the Irish 
Times, a competitor to the press outlets owned by O’Brien), who has claimed that O’Brien’s accumulation 
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In Britain, relatively simple concrete steps could be taken in this direction which do not necessarily require 
the force of law. At present the Government proactively publishes details of all meetings involving senior 
government ministers and officials, and external stakeholders. But they are published separately by each 
government department at different times, on disparate web pages, and with varying titles and file formats. 
Given the particular concerns attached to meetings with media executives and proprietors, details of these 
meetings should be published on a central register, made available in spreadsheet format, and updated at 
regular and defined intervals. Leveson himself also called for the quarterly disclosure of “the simple fact of long 
term relationships with media proprietors, newspapers editors or senior executives”; “details of all meetings 
and the fact and general nature of any discussion of media policy issues”; and “a fair and reasonably complete 
picture…of the frequency or density of other interaction (including correspondence, phone, text and email)”.35 
He also emphasised the urgency of such measures stating that “the suggestions that I have made in the 
direction of greater transparency about meetings and contacts should be considered not just as a future 
project but as an immediate need”.36  
REDEFINING MEDIA MARKETS
Beyond this, there is a longer term need to develop a robust and future proof framework for measuring 
and remedying concentration in a converged media landscape, where distinguishing media by platform 
(broadcasting, print and online) has diminishing use value. 
He points to examples such as the findings of the Moriarty Tribunal, published in 2011 and examining 
the financial affairs of leading Irish politicians and businessmen, as demonstrative of how O’Brien’s 
“private interests intersected in an unhealthy way with the processes of public decision-making”.33 
In the UK meanwhile, the Guardian’s Roy Greenslade points to O’Brien’s ability to obtain an injunction to 
prevent the reporting of a speech made to the Irish Parliament by Catherine Murphy TD concerning a 
loan O’Brien had obtained from the state-owned Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IRBC), despite the 
speech being protected by Parliamentary privilege, as a further expression of his power.34
CASE STUDY: IRELAND (CONTINUED)
33  http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/fintan-o-toole-loud-silence-on-public-interest-in-siteserv-affair-1.2233683
34  http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/may/29/irelands-media-silenced-over-mps-speech-about-denis-obrien
35  Potentially, any further transparency requirements could build upon and expand on the lobbying register created by the Transparency 
of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014.
36  Leveson, B. (2012). An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Volume III. Retrieved from http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780_iii.pdf, pp. 1457-1459
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Media convergence in this sense reflects the reality that we are rapidly moving into an age when most if not 
all news providers operate through both multi-media and on multiple platforms. The main source of confusion 
stems from categorising online news as a separate and comparable category alongside print and broadcasting. 
For a start, the internet is clearly not a single medium in the same sense as print, radio or television. If I stream 
the BBC News Channel live through my laptop, am I consuming television or online news? But especially 
problematic is the implied suggestion that companies like MSN and Buzzfeed share more similar characteristics 
with each other than they do with television, radio or print outlets. In fact, Buzzfeed is much closer to a 
broadcaster like CNN to the extent that it produces and publishers its own news, than it is to an intermediary 
like MSN that predominantly aggregates and filters news produced by others.
In its proposed framework for measuring plurality, unveiled in November 2015, Ofcom sub-divides online 
players between ‘content originators’ (those who produce original news), ‘aggregators’ (those who host and 
compile news produced by others) and intermediaries (those who act primarily as a gateway to news on 
other sites), and it further distinguishes between wholesale and retail news providers.37 But it’s primary default 
categorisation is still based on a traditional conception of platform. As technologies and platforms continue to 
evolve, this is likely to create more conceptual difficulties than it solves.
A more robust categorisation for the converged news market as a whole would centre on the varied 
gatekeeping roles played by different market players. In particular, we can conceive of five categories that 
reflect the spectrum from editorial to more structural forms of control:
 
1. At the editorial end of the spectrum are news providers that exercise control over newsgathering resources 
and a degree of brand power at the consumption end of the chain. A news provider may publish or broadcast 
on its own platforms (in print, broadcasting and/or online) as well as provide content for third party aggregators 
or exclusive retailers. It may also itself carry news content supplied by others. But the defining characteristic of 
news providers is that their core business is based on copyright – the production and ownership of original 
news content. 
2. A secondary form of gatekeeping is then denoted by aggregators who source the majority of their content 
from wholesale providers. Unlike retailers that carry the content of a single wholesale provider, aggregators 
exercise a degree of editorial control in the selection, arrangement and prioritisation of stories. In other words, 
their editorial function is implicit in layout and design (as opposed to production). But this can nevertheless 
have significant implications for the framing and promoting of particular issue agendas. 
3. A third form of gatekeeping that is close to aggregators but one step further removed from editorial control 
may be considered portals. These are defined as platforms that predominantly carry channels supplied and 
operated by third parties. The most obvious examples here would be satellite and cable television providers but 
we can also conceive of portals as online platforms that ‘embed’ third party content. These gatekeepers exercise 
only a modicum of editorial influence in the selection of which channels to carry or embed, as well as their 
arrangement in menus or electronic programme guides. 
37  Ofcom (2012, 19 June). Measuring media plurality. Retrieved from http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-
plurality/statement/statement.pdf
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4. In the fourth group, gatekeepers no longer can be thought to exercise significant editorial control over news 
output. Aside from manual editorial interventions to override code, their gatekeeping function consists in 
their power to point users towards particular types of content or particular types of content providers. They are 
essentially news gateways such as search and social networking sites, as well as open publishing and content 
sharing platforms. Their primary news activity resides in guiding news selection through recommendation, 
filtering and highlighting.  
5. The final category of gatekeepers refers to those companies that facilitate access to a network including 
internet service providers, browsers, mobile operators and app platforms. The distinguishing feature of these 
services is that they play neither a packaging nor a filtering role in news content and thus have no direct 
bearing on news consumption. However, they do have power to varying degrees over traffic management; 
that is, the power to admit, exclude, prioritise or otherwise determine the accessibility of particular content and 
services. This inevitably impacts on the relative prominence of different news services and thus, potentially at 
least, on the range of voices heard. 
The boundaries between these distinctions are of course blurred to some extent by the growing institutional 
overlap between them. Google, for instance, plays significant roles as both a gateway (through its search 
services and YouTube platform) and facilitator (through its wireless and mobile ISP services, as well as app 
platform); whilst Microsoft inhabits the roles of aggregator (msn.com), gateway (through its search and social 
networking services) as well as facilitator (through its internet service provision).
Company Provider Aggregator Portal Gateway Facilitator
BBC X
Microsoft X X X
Google X X
21st Century Fox X X
Table 1. News gatekeeping roles played by BBC, Microsoft, Google and 21st Century Fox
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21st Century Fox on the other hand – the holding company for film and broadcasting assets siphoned off from 
Murdoch’s News Corporation in 2013 – is centred on content ownership but also has a controlling stake in Sky, 
which monopolises the satellite TV platform in the UK. As such, it can be said to exercise news gatekeeping 
roles as both provider (e.g. Fox News and Sky News) as well as portal (Sky plc). 
Nevertheless, the five conceptual gatekeeping categories outlined above offer a useful starting point in the 
measurement of media concentration and plurality. The challenge for policymakers is to recognise both the 
interconnectedness of institutional gatekeepers, as well as the relatively distinct roles that they continue to play 
overall in the new information paradigm. 
Returning to Ofcom’s measuring framework, we will now address three further methodological problem areas. These 
concern the range of metrics adopted; the way in which ‘sources’ are quantified; and an absence of clear bright lines.
AN OVERFLOWING BASKET OF MEASURES AND METRICS
The first problem can be simply stated as this: the broader the array of measures and indicators adopted, the 
greater the element of interpretation afforded to any decision-making body as regards plurality ‘sufficiency’. Just 
as plurality can be thought of in many different ways, so it can be measured in many different ways. 
A prime example of this can be found in Ofcom’s qualitative ‘narrative’ which includes consideration of what it 
calls ‘contextual factors’. These refer to existing plurality safeguards including adherence to the broadcasting code, 
internal plurality measures, and the adoption of certain governance frameworks (for example, editorial boards or 
trust ownership) that may mitigate the risks of a media institution serving as a megaphone for vested interests. 
So far, so good. But things start to become cloudy when Ofcom refers to another set of indicators that will 
inform its ‘qualitative narrative’, this time to do with impact. Here, the importance attached to certain news 
sources by audiences, including levels of trust, seems to add a certain weight to their reach and consumption. 
This creates something of a logical contradiction at the heart of Ofcom’s approach. 
The contradiction arises because impact indicators are causally related to contextual factors. For instance, it 
is precisely the adoption of impartiality rules or adherence to other public service commitments that can 
engender relative ‘impact’ reflected in audience trust. Ofcom’s framework may thus consider a news provider 
to pose less of a concentration risk because of its adoption of such rules or commitments, but more of a risk 
because they increase levels of audience trust (and hence, impact). 
THE PROBLEM WITH MULTI-SOURCING
Another area of conceptual murkiness concerns what Ofcom refers to as multi-sourcing – the practice 
of consuming news from more than one source. This has become a buzzword for industry lobbyists and 
policymakers alike and on the surface, seems to be an increasingly apparent phenomenon in the online 
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news sphere. But in reality, the prevailing trend is in the exact opposite direction. To illustrate the confusion 
that abounds here, consider this statement made by the UK Government (DCMS, 2014), responding to a 
Parliamentary inquiry into media plurality:
Consumers actively multisource – such that the large majority of individuals consume a range of  
different news sources.
Although no source for the claim was provided, the report did reference Ofcom’s standard definition of news 
multi-sourcing. Yet for the very same year, Ofcom reported that the majority of people – 55 percent – get their 
news from only one or two sources across all platforms, a figure that rose to 59 percent in the following year.38 
But even these figures may well be overstating the degree of diversity in news consumption, especially when 
we consider what counts as a ‘source’ in this sense. 
We have already mentioned Ofcom’s distinction between content originators, aggregators and intermediaries 
in the online news sphere. But when it comes to survey questionnaires that interrogate the number of sources 
used ‘for news nowadays’, this distinction is not applied. For instance, in a news omnibus survey commissioned 
by Ofcom,39 respondents were asked which online sources they use and presented with a list of options that 
included content originators alongside aggregators and intermediaries. So in effect, the survey question framed 
them all as equivalent news sources. 
To illustrate how this can distort the plurality picture, let’s consider a hypothetical example. Imagine that 
respondent A and B are both avid online news consumers and have both been following recent headline 
stories on tax evasion, terrorism and the environment. They also share a tendency to gravitate towards the 
editorial style and slant offered by both the Daily Telegraph and the Mail online. Respondent A is conscious 
of her preference for these outlets and tends to visit their websites directly. She recalls reading three recent 
articles on each of the headline stories – two on the Telegraph website and one on the Mail website. She 
therefore selects these two outlets from the list appended to the question ‘which of the following do you use 
for news nowadays?’
Respondent B is relatively less brand-conscious but no less inclined towards the same stories by the same 
providers. He read a recent story on tax evasion (produced by the Telegraph) on Yahoo and another one on 
terrorism (produced by the Mail) on Facebook. He also read a third story on the environment – another from 
the Telegraph – which he recalls finding on Google News but ended up clicking on the link and reading the 
article in full on the Telegraph website. In his survey response, he therefore selects all four of these outlets – 
Yahoo, Facebook, Google News and the Telegraph – as sources he uses for news. 
The data then reveal that between them, these respondents consume six different news sources. But it fails to 
capture the fact that not only have they based their answers on consumption of the same news agenda, but 
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also the same selection of stories produced by the same two providers. By considering the likes of Google, 
Yahoo and the BBC as equivalent news sources, we are both comparing apples with oranges and potentially 
double counting sources at the same time. 
THE CASE FOR FLEXIBLE CAPS IN MEDIA OWNERSHIP
And this leads us to the final and overarching problem with Ofcom’s framework in its explicit rejection of clear 
bright lines that can act as triggers for intervention and minimise the risk of capture in policy decision-making. 
In particular, Ofcom has rejected proposals for fixed caps on media ownership arguing that they are too rigid to 
account for the complexities and uncertainties in rapidly evolving news markets. But clear bright lines are not 
necessarily synonymous with hard limits or any ‘one size fits all’ approach to remedies. What they do necessitate 
is that the precise triggers for regulatory intervention, along with a range of prescribed remedies, are explicitly 
set out in law rather than left to the discretionary judgement of regulators or ministers. 
Ofcom itself has previously suggested to the government indicative ranges for thresholds that could potentially 
act as triggers. And there are a wide range of behavioural and structural remedies that have been proposed for 
different cases and circumstances, many of which have established precedent in anti-trust regulation ranging 
from editorial boards to enforced divestment. It makes sense that a decision-making body should have at its 
disposal a range of such remedies to apply in different circumstances and to different types of news institution. 
In terms of behavioural remedies, an emphasis on forms of governance that support an ‘arms-length’ between 
media owners and editorial output – such as editorial boards – would fit with plurality goals without imposing 
forms of public service or content regulation on the press.
 
ALGORITHM TRANSPARENCY
Beyond conventional plurality remedies mentioned above, a number of scholars in recent years have called 
for measures aimed at increasing the transparency and accountability of major news algorithms.40 There are 
broadly two potential ways in which these algorithms can impact on news plurality. First, generic weightings 
for news ‘quality’ can favour dominant and large scale news providers over smaller players and new entrants, 
especially if they rank providers based on volume of output or traffic. Second, personalisation filters can limit 
individual exposure to alternative perspectives or diverse expressions and inhibit the potential for particular 
viewpoints to reach a critical mass audience.
Though we don’t yet know the prevalence or extent of these trends, the risks are endemic in the growing 
interventionism that has shaped news algorithm development over recent years. That said, it would be neither 
practical nor desirable to eliminate personalised content filters in news algorithms altogether. 
40  See, for instance, Napoli, P. (2014). Digital intermediaries and the public interest in standard in algorithm governance. LSE Media Policy 
Project. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/07/digital-intermediaries-and-the-public-interest-standard-in-
algorithm-governance/; and Goodman, E. (2014). Informational justice as the new media pluralism. LSE Media Policy Project. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/19/informational-justice-as-the-new-media-pluralism/
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Given the inherent tension between personalisation filters and both privacy and speech rights, a policy 
emphasis on algorithm transparency would seem the most appropriate course for policymakers to chart. All the 
more so because of the hidden qualities of algorithm filters which can make news agendas appear natural and 
spontaneous rather than the work of complex code. Transparency enforcement also reflects the added value of 
the internet commons as a space within the wider news ecology where, in principle, the flow of content is not 
‘directed’ either by corporations or authorities. 
As a start, major news search engines and news feed services could be mandated to present users with 
prominent opt outs (or opt ins) for personalised filtering. A more radical step would involve subjecting major 
news algorithms to periodic audits to ensure that they are consistent with baseline plurality objectives. Given 
the relative infancy of this issue in media plurality policy debates, a dedicated task force or working group 
should be convened, at the European level, to investigate potential routes towards implementing algorithm 
governance as part of a broader plurality framework.
This essay began by asking how to regulate concentrations of media power in the post digital age. It addressed 
this question in three broad policy areas with a focus on the UK context, but with wider resonance for media 
policy across Europe: Redistributive frameworks for nurturing plurality ‘from below’; the future of the BBC; and 
promoting transparency and plurality in converged media markets. This yielded a number of recommendations, 
each of which speaks to the values of plurality, independence and transparency as foundational to virtuous 
media markets:
1. A NEW LEVY IMPOSED ON THE REVENUES OF MAJOR ONLINE SEARCH AND SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SERVICES
This levy should be used to cross-subsidise local and long-form journalism which is facing acute pressures 
in the evolving news landscape, but which nonetheless typifies the media’s potentially unique contribution 
to democratic life. An independent media plurality board or trust should be established with the remit of 
administering the fund and supporting these forms of journalism in a range of different vehicles and providers. 
2. A NEW DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE FOR THE BBC TO IMPROVE EDITORIAL 
INDEPENDENCE
The government’s white paper on Charter Renewal preserves the BBC as a wholly public broadcaster funded by 
the license fee, at least for the duration of the current parliament. But it sets a potentially dangerous precedent 
in consolidating the government’s power of appointments over the new ‘unitary board’ with responsibility for 
editorial output. A more decentralised structure with devolved editorial responsibility would shore up the BBC’s 
independence and could be modelled on the structure of the Dutch NPO. 
3. ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY FOR MEETINGS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN SENIOR MEDIA 
AND POLITICAL FIGURES
There is an urgent need for the government to adopt proactive measures in line with recommendations in 
the Leveson Report as well as recent changes to the ministerial code. Simple practical steps could be taken to 
ensure that details of meetings and interactions are published in a more timely, accessible and comprehensive 
manner. The UK Government should lobby for such changes at the EU levels as well, to reflect the globalised 
nature of a lot of media.
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4. NEW LEGISLATION TO SUPPORT MEDIA PLURALITY AND EXTEND THE EXISTING PUBLIC 
INTEREST TEST.
There is a pressing need to develop a new legislative framework that will provide explicit guidelines as to 
how and when Ofcom should intervene in media markets in order to remedy concentrations that threaten 
media plurality. An approach that combines clear bright lines with in-built flexibility in determining remedies 
on a case-by-case basis will protect against both the risk of policy capture in decision-making, whilst also 
accommodate the complexities of dynamic and converged media markets.
5. A NEW EUROPE-WIDE TASK FORCE FOR THE REGULATION OF MEDIA TRANSPARENCY  
AND GOVERNANCE
The filtering effects of news feed and search algorithms can potentially impact on media plurality in a number of 
different ways. Further research is needed into this emergent and rapidly evolving area of concern which would 
be best pursued at the European level to encourage harmonisation of approaches. The Governments should also 
lobby for greater levels of transparency in media ownership across Europe, but particularly in Eastern Europe, as 
the Romanian and Ukrainian case studies in this essays have highlighted as needing special attention.
The challenge for policymakers is to recognise that media plurality and transparency issues are presented by 
both old and new market players, and both within and across different platforms. Above all, there is a need to 
acknowledge that progressive reform is both necessary and possible. The need for reform of media ownership 
and plurality rules has been a much talked about issue for some time now, and in many parts of the world. 
But as digital news markets reach maturity and the political long grass continues to grow, we need action to 
develop and implement policies that will promote a genuine redistribution of voice and communicative power.
